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NoTEs AND CommrENTs
complain that too many people carry guns, and they clamor for more
strict laws; the average citizen, who knows of no reason why a person
other than a policeman should carry a weapon, joins in and is swayed
by the vast amount of publicity given the latest local shooting affray.
On the other hand, sportsmen, hunters, and others, backed by such
organizations as the National Rifle Association and the arms and am-
munitions companies, ask for more lenient legislation. The lawmakers,
who are in the middle, ofttimes please no one. But this does not mean
that there is not a happy medium between the advocates of both
arguments. Some believe that the solution can be found in the
Uniform Pistol Act.50 This act, which has been withdrawn for further
study by the National Conference of Commissioners, provides briefly:
(1) requirement of a license to carry a pistol either openly or con-
cealed; (2) regulation of the sale of pistols; (3) denial to criminals
and certain others the use of and the right to possess pistols; (4)
exceptions to persons at home or at their fixed places of business; and
(5) exceptions to certain classes of persons including peace officers,
gun dealers, target shooters, etc. Whether this act is the answer to
the problem of pistol control is not a matter for this discourse to
decide, since it involves a number of problems which would require
considerable discussion. But even if it is not the solution, certainly
a state committee comprised of representatives from all interested
groups could come forth with a suggested act that would sub-
stantially meet the needs of the people and still control the frequent
criminal and careless uses of such weapons.
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RES IPSA LOQUITUR AS APPLIED TO
MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS
The existence of multiple defendants or instrumentalities which
may have caused or contributed to an injury raises an interesting
question of whether or not res ipsa loquitur should apply in this type
of case.
As usually employed, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur requires
that: (1) the injury be one which ordinarily would not occur in the
absence of someone's negligence; (2) the instrumentality causing the
' For an example of the Act, see ALA. CODE Ar. tit. 14, secs. 172-186(1940). Also see D. C. CODE, sees. 22-3201-3216 (1940); IND. STAT. ANN. sees.
10-4736-4751 (Burns 1942); PA. STAT., tit. 18, see. 4628 (Furdon 1936); S. D.
CODE, sees. 21.01-21.0117 (1939); WAsH. REv. CODE, sees. 9.41-41.160 (1951).
KENT UcKY LAw JoumNAL
injury be within the exclusive control of the defendant or his servants;
(8) the possibility of contributory negligence on the part of the plain-
tiff be eliminated.' Some courts have added a fourth condition, viz.:
that evidence as to the true explanation of the accident must be more
readily accessible to the defendant. 2 All these factors being present, a
prima facie case is presented, and the jury may infer from the circum-
stances, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care.3 The doctrine is largely founded
on necessity-it enables a plaintiff to make a submissible case when
otherwise he could not do so because of his inability to know or
ascertain the facts.
In order for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply, the plaintiff
must first present sufficient proof of the existence of all the elements
necessary to bring the doctrine into operation. One of the elements,
as we have seen, is that the instrumentality causing the injury be
within the exclusive control of the defendant. This requirement
presents complications where there is more than on defendant or in-
strumentality which contributes to the injury.4 In such cases it can-
not be said that the instrumentality causing the injury is within the
exclusive control of any single defendant. This discussion will be con-
fined to the problem of whether or not res ipsa loquitur can be applied
in such a case.
The purpose of the requirement that the instrumentality causing
the injury be within the exclusive control of the defendant should be
evident. It is to focus the inference (or presumption, as the case may
be) of negligence on the defendant. When another person or defend-
ant is involved in the case, the court has the problem of whether the
inference should be raised against both, or any of the defendants
alone. It has been stated as a broad proposition that if it appears that
two or more instrumentalities, only one of which was 1uder the
'PnossE, ToRTs 291 et seq. (1941); see also 9 WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE sec. 2509
(3rd Ed. 1940).
'Wilson v. East St. Louis and Interurban Water Co., 295 IM. App. 603, 15
N.E. 2d 599 (1938); Levendusky v. Empire Rubber Mfg. Co., 84 N.J.L. 698, 87
Atl. 838 (1913).
'38 Am . Jxu. 989-991 (1941).
Diamond v. Weyerhaeuser, 178 Cal. 540, 174 Pac. 38 (1918) (Collision of
automobile and milk wagon); Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal. App. 2d 429, 47 P. 2d
740 (1935) (Shared control of surgical operation); Yellow Cab Co. v. Hodgson,
91 Colo. 365, 14 P. 2d 1081 (1932) (Collision of carrier with another vehicle).
'Palmer Buick Co. v. Chenall, 119 Ga. 837, 47 S.E. 329 (1904) (to the
effect that it raises an inference that can be rebutted by the defendant). Prosser,
The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MsNN. L. tEv. 241 (1936), states
that some twenty-three jurisdictions clearly adopt this view, while about six more
tend toward it.
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defendant's control, contributed to or may have contributed to the
injury, the doctrine cannot be invoked.;
Exclusive control on the part of a single defendant, however, is
not always required for the application of res ipsa loquitur. This is
particularly so in cases where the plaintiff has been injured while a
passenger of a common carrier which has collided with another car-
rier or vehicle. In such cases a dozen or more courts have interpreted
the doctrine so as to exclude the technical requirement of exclusive
control.7 Representative of this class of cases is Jackson v. Capital
Transit Co.,s where the plaintiff who was a passenger on a street car
operated by one of the defendants, a transit company, was injured
as a result of collision between the street car and a truck of the co-
defendant, a local laundry. The instrumentality was not solely in
control of the defendant carrier, since the laundry truck might also
have been responsible for the injury. The plaintiff alleged general
negligence on the part of both defendants. Upon proving that she
was a passenger, that a collision took place, and that she was injured
as a result, the plaintiff rested her case. In their answers, the
defendants charged each other with being negligent and urged that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable where it appears that
two or more instrumentalities, only one of which was under the con-
trol of the defendant, may have contributed to the injury. The trial
court gave a directed verdict for both defendants, and the plaintiff
appealed. The Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, although holding res ipsa loquitur inapplicable to the other
vehicle, said that a passenger of a common carrier who is injured as a
88 AM. Jun. 997 (1941).
Among these jurisdictions are: Arizona, Pickwick Stages Corp. v. Messinger,
44 Ariz. 174, 86 P. 2d 168 (1934); Arkansas, Biddle v. Riley, 108 Ark. 206, 176
S.W. 134 (1915); California, Osgood v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 187 Cal. 280,
70 Pac. 169 -(1902); Holt v. Yellow Cabs Co. of San Diego, 124 Cal. App. 885, 12
P. 2d 472 (1932); Iowa, Crozier v. Hawkeye Stages, 209 Iowa 313, 228 N.W.
320 (1929); Preston v. Des Moines Ry., 214 Iowa 156, 241 N.W. 648 (1932);
Kentucky, Central Passenger Ry. v. Kuhn, 86 Ky. 578, 61 S.W. 441 (1888); see
Vogt v. Cin., Newport & Coy. St. Ry. Co. 812 Ky. 668, 229 S.W. 2d 461 (1950);
Louisiana, Dawson v. Tage Bros., 15 La. App. 326, 131 So. 716 (1931); Maryland,
Cumberland and W. Transit Co. v. Metz, 158 Md. 424, 149 Ad. 4 (1930); Mis-
souri, Hurley v. Missouri Pac. Trans. Co., 56 S.W. 2d 620 (Mo. App. 1933); Zichler
v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 832 Mo. 912, 59 S.W. 2d 654 (1933); New Jersey,
Cox v. Scott, 104 N. J. Law 371, 140 Ad. 890 (1928); Lunaski v. S. Kosson and
Sons, 149 At. 760 (N. J. 1980); New York, Maher v. Metropolition St. Ry., 102
App. Div. 517, 92 N.Y.S. 825 (1905); Rhode Island, De Nicola v. United Elec. Ry.
Co.; 55 R.I. 402, 182 Ad. 1 (1935); West Virginia, Hodge v. Sycamore Coal Co.,
82 W. Va. 106, 95 S.E. 808 (1918); United States, Interstate Stage Lines v. Ayers,
42 F. 2d 611 (8th Cir. 1930).
872 W.L.R. 718 (D.C. Mum. A pp.) 38 A. 2d 108 (1944); see; 25 A.L.R.
690 (1923); 83 A.L.R. 1163 (1933); and 161 A.L.R. 1118 (1946); 10 Am.
JuR. 879 (1937).
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result of a collision with an independent vehicle need prove only the
occurence of the accident and the resulting injuries. Then, under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the carrier must rebut the inference of
negligence.
From a study of the cases, this inference or presumption against
the carrier appears to rest on several distinct theories:
1. The notion that the passenger's action against the carrier is
based upon breach of a contract of safe transportation, that he
makes out his case by proving the contract and the injury, and
that due care is an affirmative defense on the part of the carrier.9
2. Defendant's exclusive control of the situation, as between the
carrier and the passenger, and the improbability that any ac-
cident would occur unless defendant has been negligent.'0
3. The fact that evidence as to the cause of the accident can be
more readily obtained by defendant than by the plaintiff."-
4. The fact that a carrier is under a duty to exercise an unusually
high degree of care toward its passengers, it following from this
that when an accident occurs, it must be presumed that the
carried is at fault.42
Although applying it in the carrier cases,'13 most of the courts have
refused to apply res ipsa loquitur against the driver of a privately
owned automobile in favor of a guest in his car who is injured by a
collision.'4 The California court, in the case of Godfry v. Brown,15
refused to make any distinction between the situations and held the
private driver subject to the same "presumption" as the carrier. In
this case the plaintiff was a gratuitous guest in Brown's automobile
when an automobile driven by Cole collided with it at an intersection.
The plaintiff was injured and sued both drivers on the theory of res
ipsa toquitur. The court held that the doctrine is as applicable to
cases where both vehicles are privately owned as it is to cases where
one is a common carrier for hire. It pointed out that the inference
and the workability of the rules are the same as in the carrier cases.
As a matter of physics the court was probably correct. The same ele-
' Burgoyne v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 167 IM. App. 59 (1912); Steele v.
Southern Ry. Co., 55 S.C. 889, 83 S.E. 509 (1899).
" Union Traction Co. v. Mann, 72 Ind. App. 50, 124 N.E. 510 (1919); Curtis
v. Rochester and Syracuse R.fl. Co., 18 N.Y. 534 (1859).
' Supra note 10. See also Steele v. Southern fly. Co., supra note 9.
" Housel v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 167 Cal. 245, 139 Pac. 73 (1914).
"Price v. Ry. Co., 220 Mo. 453, 119 S.W. 932 (1909); Stauffer v. Metro-
politan St. Ry. Co., 243 Mo. 305, 147 S.W. 1032 (1912); Laundon & Eighth Ave.
Ry. Co., 162 N.Y. 380, 56 N.W. 988 (1900).
"See State ex rel. Brancoto v. Trimble 332 Mo. 318, 18 S.W. 2d 4 (1929).
222 Cal. 57, 29 P. 2d 165 (1934).
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ments are present in both cases-the only difference being the relation-
ship of the parties. It may be argued with some plausibility that the
nature of the act, not the relationship of the parties, should be the
governing factor as to whether or not the doctrine applies. Most courts
have not seen fit to look at the question from this angle, however, and
have confined the doctrine almost exclusively to carrier cases. The
cases more frequently stress the fact that the law requires of carriers
a very high degree of care toward their passengers, and it is more
reasonable to require them to come forward with the proof.16 In the
light of all the circumstances it is believed that the correct result is
reached in the carrier cases. It seems only just that the passenger of a
common carrier should be entitled to a satisfactory explanation of the
collision by the carrier who was entrusted with the passenger's safety.
That the burden of overcoming the inference of negligence should
be placed upon the carrier is further supported by the fact that the
carrier is in a much better position to show that the proper degree of
care could not have avoided the collision than the passenger is to show
that the proper degree was not exercised. One writer has gone so far
as to suggest that it is common experience that in traffic accidents it is
highly probable that both drivers are negligent. It therefore would
not be unreasonable to presume negligence on the part of both.' 7
The California case'- could be justified on this basis.
In view of the fact that the courts consistently have disagreed as
to the applicability of res ipsa loquitur to collisions between vehicles
on land, there is no reason to expect any more unanimity in the field
of aviation. 19 Many courts unreasonably refuse to apply the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur to airplane accidents involving one airplane. These
courts, in the absence of evidence, conclude that the airplane has not
yet reached such a stage of development as to justify the birth of an
inference or presumption of negligence from the mere occurrence of
the accident. One would normally expect the courts, in view of the
general rule, absolutely to refuse to apply res ipsa loquitur to mid-air
collisions between two planes, but surprisingly enough, in Smith v.
O'Donnell,2" the trial court instructed the jury in effect that res ipsa
loquitur was applicable to mid-air collisions, since a collision of two
" M'Currie v. Southern Pac. Co., 167 Cal. 245, 139 Pac. 73, 51 L.R.A. (U.S.)
1005; Osgood v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 137 Gal. 280, 70 Pac. 169 (1902).
',Prosser, Collision of Carriers With Other Vehicles, 30 ILL. L. REmv. 980, 992
(1936).
'1Godfry v. Brown, 222 Cal. 57, 29 P. 2d 165 (1934).
Goldin, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Aviation Law, 18 So. CA. L. REv. 15, 124(1944).
215 Cal. 714, 12 P. 2d 933 (1932).
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planes in mid-air does not ordinarily occur if a proper degr- L -,a
is observed, and therefore the burden should be onrithe carrier to
show that he was not at fault. The California Supreme Court upheld
the instruction.
The willingness of the California courts to invoke the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur to a case arising out of a collision in the air is again
demonstrated in Rainger v. American Airlines, Inc.,21 where a trans-
port plane and all its occupants were lost as a result of a collision with
a United States Army plane. In a suit against the common carrier
for wrongful death of a passenger, the pilot of the Army aircraft
testified that he had informed one of the pilots of the transport that
he intended to fly close to the larger ship in order to look at it, and
that the collision occurred when the Army plane approached the
defendant's airplane. The court, on its own motion, gave the following
instruction to the jury:
From the mere happening of the accident involved in this case, as
established by the evidence, there arises an inference that the proxi-
mate cause of the occurrence was some negligent conduct on the part
of the defendant, American Airlines.... Therefore, you should weigh
any evidence tending to overcome that inference, bearing in mind
that it is incumbent upon the defendant, American Airlines, to rebut
the inference .... 22
The same reason was held to apply to airlines as applies to other
common carriers, viz., the idea that the carrier owes its passengers a
very high degree of care. Mid-air collision between aircraft is a
relatively rare species of aerial mishap, and the plaintiff would have
even less chance of producing affirmative evidence of defendant's
negligence, if there be such, than he would if he were riding on a
train, bus or street car.
An examination of the cases in other negligence situations discloses
that the test of actual exclusive control of an instrumentality has not
been strictly followed, but exceptions or qualifications have been
recognized where the purpose of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
would otherwise be defeated. Thus in the California case of Armstrong
v. Wallace,23 a patient sued both the hospital and her physician for
failure to remove a sponge from her abdomen after a Caesarian opera-
tion. The court held that the fact that there was a possibility that the
hospital servants might have been negligent did not preclude ap-
plication of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine against the physician. The
1 (1943) U.S. Av. Rep. 122 (Cal. Supr. Ct. 1943) as cited in Goldin, op. cit.
supra, note 19 at 145.
2 Id. at 146.8 Cal. App. 2d 429, 47 P. 2d 740 (1935).
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P,-met more squarely in the subsequent case of Ybara v.
Sptirigard, 24 .w' ere the plaintiff sought damages from one or several
of defendant xiurses and doctors for personal injuries, allegedly in-
flicted by the defendants during the course of a surgical operation.
While under anesthetic, an injury was caused to his shoulder, which
was not within the area of operation. -Ieluded in the suit were all
the defendants who might have hadcY.ome. control at one time or
another over the instrumentality or instrumentalities2 5 which might
have injured him. Plaintiff contended that he was entitled.to rely on
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Defendants maintained that there
was a division of responsibility in the use of the instrumentalities
which might have caused the injury, and it might have resulted from
the separate act of anyone, so that the rule of res ipsa loquitur could
not be invoked against any one of them; and that there were several
instrumentalities, and no showing was made as to which caused the
injury or as to the particular defendant in control of it, so that the
doctrine could not apply. The court held that all those defendants
who had any control over the plaintiffs body, or over the instru-
mentalities which might have caused the injury could properly be
called upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an explana-
tion of their conduct. It further stated that neither the number nor
relationship of the defendants alone determines whether res ipsa
loquitur applies. The case has been criticized,2 6 but on its facts it is
believed that the court reached the proper conclusion. It was essen-
tially a policy consideration. Since the plaintiff was rendered uncon-
scious for the purpose of undergoing surgical treatment, it would be
manifestly unreasonable for defendants to insist that he identify any
one of them as having had control over the injuring instrumentality or
instrumentalities. Without the application of the doctrine, the plain-
tiff could not have recovered here.
Likewise, the doctrine has found application in a few manu-
facturing cases where there was a division of control.27 In Claxton
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coleman,28 plaintiff brought an action
against a dealer and a bottling company for injuries sustained when
2'25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P. 2d 687 (1944).
'It did not appear whether only one instrumentality caused the injury; but
it is more likely that it did. In the court's mind, the important thing seemed to
be control of the situation.
'Note, 18 So. CAL. L. REv. 810 (1945). But see notes, 9 U. of DET. L. J.51 (1945); 40 IL. L. RE . 421 (1946); 25 B. U. L. REv. 295 (1945).
"Motor Sales and Service, Inc. v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 131 So. 623 (La.
1930) (Res ipsa loquitur applicable even though at the time of injury the defendant
had neither control nor possession of the instrumentality which was the cause
thereof); Hertzler v. Monshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155 (1924).
' 68 Ga. App. 302, 22 S.E. 2d 768 (1944).
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a Coca-Cola, purchased from the dealer and manufactured by the
bottling company, contained a considerable quantity of kerosene and
pine needles. Plaintiff recovered against both defendants on the
theory of res ipsa loquitur because of the possible negligence of either
or both defandants.
In Hertzler v. Monshen , 29 plaintiff brought on action against a mil-
ler and retail dealer for the death of her husband which was caused
by arsenate of lead in flour purchased from the dealer. Although not
specifically mentioning the doctrine by name, the court in effect held
that res ipsa "loquitur applied though reversing the case on other
grounds. The court said that the burden was on the plaintiff to show
that the poison was in the flour when purchased from the dealer. If
such a fact is established, plaintiff will make out a prima facie case
against both defendants requiring them to excuse themselves. If the
dealer satisfies a jury that the poison did not get into the flour while
in his possession, then he is not liable and excuse, if any, is to be made
by the manufacturers.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been expanded beyond its
original meaning in multiple defendant cases. The requirement of
"exclusive control" has broken down, especially in cases where justice
would not be done with a strict interpretation of the doctrine. This
is so in the carrier cases where the passenger was owed a high degree
of care and in other cases like malpractice and manufacturing, where
it would be grossly unreasonable to require the plaintiff to come for-
ward with affirmative evidence and identify the particular person who
had control of the injuring instrumentality. One cannot argue with
such results. In applying res ipsa loquitur, the fact must be remem-
bered that it fundamentally is a rule of necessity devised to do justice.
This purpose must not be defeated by a mechanical interpretation of
the doctrine. On the other hand, res ipsa loquitur, if it is to have any
meaning at all, must not be extended indiscriminately. It is believed
that the extension as applied to the cases discussed represents a
healthy growth in the law. As long as the applicability of the doctrine
to multiple defeiidants is made to depend upon the peculiar facts and
circumstances of each individual case and is applied with care and
only when justice requires, it should not be material whether there
is one or more persons who had, or may have had control of the
injuring instrumentality.
WmlTAm C. BIRmAOlD, Jit.
-9228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155 (1924).
